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This paper formulates and estimates an economic mode1 of landlord housing 
abandonment, using New York City data. A major focus of the study is to 
investigate the importance of property taxes in the abandonment decision, as 
opposed to such factors as the types of buildings or the characteristics of households 
occupying the neighborhood. There are two major results: first, cities can reduce the 
rate of abandonment by initiating foreclosure as soon as buildings go into arrears 
on property tax payments (rather than allowing a grace period), and second, 
property taxes are an important and significant determinant of abandonment rates. 
The benefits and costs of a policy whereby cities would systematically reduce 
property taxes in blighted neighborhoods by lowering assessment levels are also 
explored. 0 1986 Academic Press. Inc. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Housing abandonment-the voluntary relinquishing of ownership by 
private landlords of rental property-is frequent in many U.S. cities but 
has costly consequences for city governments. It is diacult to document 
since most available data refer to a different, although related, phenomenon 
-that of buildings becoming uninhabited by tenants. While landlord and 
tenant abandonment often occur simultaneously, they may not, and build- 
ings may be owned but unoccupied or no longer owned but still occupied. 
Desertion of central city neighborhoods by their inhabitants is tied to the 
trend toward suburbanization and declining population of central cities. 
The result is that some urban housing units are no longer used. Ownership 
abandonment, however, is a narrower problem and a more immediate 
economic decision. Each period landlords can choose to continue owning 
and operating marginal buildings or to abandon them according to which 
alternative leaves the landlord better off. 
Economists who have studied “slum” housing markets suggest that 
ownership abandonment is not a random or unexpected event, but a 
‘1 am grateful to Bruce Bender, Ted Bergstrom, Howard Chernick, Paul Courant, Roger H. 
Gordon, Dick Netzer, John Yinger, and the referee for helpful comments, and to Donald 
Negri and Robert Levinson for research assistance. This paper was made possible in part by 
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planned occurrence. These markets are said to attract specialized en- 
trepreneurs for whom ownership abandonment is but the last step in a 
planned process of deferring maintenance, dropping services, and generally 
trading off immediate profits against a lengthening of the owned lifetime of 
the building. Salins [6] and Stemlieb and Burchell [12] suggest that land- 
lords follow a particular order in reducing expenses. First, they delay or 
drop nonessential repairs. Second, they default on mortgage obligations. 
This may lead to foreclosure by the lender, but often does not if the lender 
does not wish to own the building. Third, property tax payments are 
stopped. This starts a timetable for loss of ownership, since cities take over 
properties whose taxes are in arrears for a certain number of years, usually 
1 to 3. Thus the decision to cease paying property taxes is a decision to 
abandon the building, once the tax arrears exceed the city’s foreclosure 
per&l2 
This paper explores and estimates an economic model of the decision to 
abandon ownership of housing, using data from New York City. New York 
City is particularly well-suited to studying ownership abandonment, since it 
has a widespread abandonment problem as well as data concerning proper- 
ties in arrears on taxes. During the late 197Os, about 14% of all residential 
properties in the city were in arrears on taxes by 9 months or more but were 
not yet taken over by the city.3 
A major focus of the paper is to explore the importance of property la.xe.9 
in the abandonment decision, as opposed to such factors as the physical 
characteristics of buildings being abandoned or the characteristics of people 
occupying the neighborhood. This is an important policy issue, since 
property taxes are determined by cities themselves. Many U.S. central cities 
have assessment patterns which change infrequently. Since poor neighbor- 
hoods are likely to have stagnant or declining property values, effective 
property tax rates often rise relative to value and even rise in absolute value 
(due to statutory tax rate increases) as buildings age and neighborhoods 
decline. In many such areas, property taxes constitute the largest operating 
expense.4 This encourages ownership abandonment. But abandonment is 
expensive for cities, since either the city itself must become the landlord of 
abandoned buildings or the abandonment of ownership leads to withdrawal 
‘Peterson [3] and Peterson et al. [4] present an alternative view of the abandonment process 
which stresses the unwillingness of small owners to invest in or to maintain properties on 
which they have incurred unforeseen capital losses. Also see Stegman [9] and [lo]. 
‘For tax purposes a single property could be a one- or two-family house, a rental or 
cooperative apartment building, or a condominium apartment. Since abandomnent rates are 
generally lower for single-family houses and small buildings, the number of abandoned 
housing units probably exceeds the 14% figure. For data sources, see below. 
4Stemlieb and Burchell[12] suggest that property taxes were about 35% of rents in a sample 
of slum buildings in Newark, N.J., in 1971. For earlier data, see Stemlieb [ll]. 
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of services (heat, utilities) and desertion by tenants. In the former case, the 
city itself must operate’ the building and may end up making repairs that 
have been neglected by private landlords, even though rent payments do 
not cover costs. In the latter case, the city must bear the cost of rehousing 
former tenants and of demolishing or boarding up vacant buildings.5 Thus 
an important policy issue is whether systematic downward reassessment of 
properties in blighted neighborhoods can benefit cities by reducing owner- 
ship abandonment. 6 This either could be part of a general move toward 
assessing property taxes as a uniform percentage of market value for all 
properties, or could be a more limited change in which taxes would be 
lowered in neighborhoods where abandonments occur but the general 
pattern of property tax administration would remain unchanged. 
Section II poses a theoretical model of owners’ decisions to abandon 
buildings. Section III describes the data and the empirical model and 
presents results. Section IV considers the benefits and costs of a policy of 
discouraging landlord abandonment of housing by systematically reducing 
property tax assessments in declining neighborhoods. 
II. THE ABANDONMENT DECISION 
Suppose that the production function for housing is 
Q = Q(K D); QK ’ 0, Q, < 0, Qm, Q,, < 0, (1) 
where Q is housing quality per housing unit, K is capital per housing unit, 
and D is density (or dwelling units per unit of land). QKK < 0 implies that 
extra capital has a declining positive effect on housing quality and Qoo < 0 
implies that extra density has an increasing negative effect on housing 
quality. 
Housing quality is assumed to depreciate exponentially at a rate d per 
unit of time. The rate of depreciation depends positively on a vector of 
attributes of the neighborhood, denoted G, and negatively on the amount of 
maintenance. Maintenance per housing unit per unit of time is denoted m, 
so that d = d(m, G) and d, < 0. The price per unit of maintenance is pm. 
The rent per unit of housing quality per unit of time, P, is also assumed to 
vary with the vector of neighborhood attributes, G. Thus P = P(G) and 
PG > 0. 
‘New York City does not attempt to collect unpaid property taxes from owners of buildings 
that is has taken over. 
6Peterson et al. [4] argue that property taxes are not an important factor in ownership 
abandonment because by the time properties are lost to foreclosure, owners have not been 
paying taxes for several years. However, the model posed below argues that taxes are 
nonetheless an important factor in the abandonment decision, since the grace period until 
foreclosure is fixed. Taxes therefore have their effect with a lag. 
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The cost of capital per unit per year, pk, is constant. Property taxes per 
housing unit, T, are assumed to depend on neighborhood quality variables 
and on the level of capital per housing unit. Thus T = T(G, K) and 
TK > 0. We neglect the effect of taxes other than property taxes. Land value 
per unit is L. 
Owners of vacant lots are assumed to maximize discounted future profits 
in choosing the best land use. For the lot owner who decides to build new 
housing on his lot, discounted profit is maximized over K, D, and m to 
determine the optimal quality and density of housing and the optimal 
spending on maintenance, given the exogenous attributes of the neighbor- 




e-(r+d)rPQD - e-“( DT + pkKD + mp,QD))dt. (2) 
K,D,m 0 
The first term in (2) is rental income, the second is property taxes, the third 
is the cost of capital, and the fourth is the cost of maintenance. Rent 
receipts decline at rate d over time, both because of the decline in the 
building’s quality over time and because there is a higher vacancy rate as 
the building deteriorates. Future rent receipts, taxes, maintenance and 
capital costs all are discounted at rate r.7 
Substituting (1) into (2) and differentiating, we can solve for the optimal 
levels of quality and density at time t, KF and D:, as a function of the 
price per unit of housing at time t, or 
K: = K@(C)) and 0;” = D(P,(G,)). (3) 
However, for the owner of a building already constructed, the quality and 
density levels are given and the main variables under the owner’s control 
are the maintenance expenditures and the date of abandonment or recon- 
struction of the building. For existing buildings, the exogenous levels of 
quality and density may be inappropriate for the neighborhood’s current 
attribute level and housing prices, which are likely to have changed since 
the building was built. 
Suppose that neighborhood quality has risen since the building was built. 
Then the rise in rents implies that it is worthwhile to rebuild or renovate the 
building at a higher quality level and probably a higher density level, either 
immediately or in the future. 8 A large divergence between actual versus 
optimal levels of K and D often is associated with outbreaks of arson, since 
a hot fire permits immediate readjustment. 
‘See Smith [S] and Bender [l] for discussion and development of a similar model. 
“Bender [2] derives the comparative statics properties of (3). I f  QKD = 0, then dK/dP is 
positive under reasonable conditions and dD/dP is also positive under somewhat more 
stringent conditions. If  QKD # 0, then both signs are indeterminate. 
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If the neighborhood quality has fallen since the building was built, then 
the owner may wish to abandon it at some point in the future. Abandon- 
ment will be planned if at the current level of rents in the neighborhood, 
P, = P(G,), it is not worthwhile either for the owner to rebuild or renovate 
the building at any feasible quality and density level or for the owner to 
spend enough to maintain the building indefinitely at its current quality and 
density level. In this case the timing of the planned abandomnent is the 
major decision made by the owner. 
We now turn to an analysis of this decision. Assume that an existing 
building will be abandoned at some point in the future, because neighbor- 
hood quality has declined since it was built. The owner decides when to 
abandon it so as to maximize the discounted present value of rents minus 
property taxes during the remaining period over which the building is held. 
The abandonment process is initiated by the owner ceasing to pay property 
taxes. The city then allows a fixed number of years of tax arrears to 
accumulate before it forecloses on the property. Define t = 0 as the present, 
t = t, as the abandonment date or the date when the owner stops paying 
taxes, and t = t, + g as the foreclosure date when the city takes over the 
building. The length of the grace period, g, between abandonment and 
foreclosure is exogenously determined by each city. 
In modeling abandonment, we simplify the model by assuming that the 
depreciation rate is fixed and that maintenance expenditures are zero. (The 
latter is equivalent to assuming that rent receipts by the landlord are net of 
maintenance costs.) This assumption is made to avoid introducing extra 
unobservable variables into the model to be estimated. With this simplifica- 
tion, Fig. 1 shows the pattern of nominal rents and taxes per housing unit 
over time. For given levels of capital per housing unit (K) and neighbor- 
hood quality (G), rents decline exponentially at rate d and taxes are 
assumed to remain constant. The period over which the owner holds the 
building is divided into an initial period from t = 0 to t,, when taxes are 
paid, and the grace period from t = t, to t, + g, when no taxes are paid. 
@g tn” t1’+g 
time 
FIGURE 1 
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As shown, the owner ceases paying taxes at t, = t,’ when rents still exceed 
taxes. Profits are shown as the shaded area.’ 
The owner’s problem is therefore to set t, so as to maximize market 
value (MV), which equals discounted future rents minus taxes, or 
Mjr= p+ye_ ('+d)rPQD)dt - /r"(e-'fDT)dr. 
The first term in (4) is rents, which are received from the present until 
t = t, + g, and the second term is property taxes, which are paid from the 
present to c = t,. We assume that the owner has already ceased making 
payments on the building’s mortgage, if any. (The decision to abandon 
mortgage payments could be modeled explicitly using a similar approach.) 
The first- and second-order conditions for profit maximization are 
e-d(fA+g)pQD = e-“ATD and 
( -d)e-d’.c”+d’spQD < 0. 
(5) 
(6) 
Equation (5) says that at the optimal time of abandonment, the gain from 
retaining ownership of the building one period longer, which means that 
one more period of rents is received g periods in the future, should be just 
offset by the fact that one period more of taxes must be paid immediately. 
At the time of abandonment, the extra rent payment to be received g 
periods in the future is e -(r+dMr~ +g)PQD, while the extra tax payment paid 
immediately costs e -“ATD. As long as the grace period is positive, it is 
profitable to abandon the building when current rents exceed current taxes, 
as shown by the shaded area in Fig. 1. Equation (6) says that in addition, 
rents should be declining faster than taxes. (The latter is always satisfied 
given the exponentially declining rent function and the constant taxes 
assumed here.) 
This result seems somewhat counterintuitive. However, suppose that we 
compare the profitability from a landlord’s standpoint of abandoning a 
building at t = t;, as shown in Fig. 1, with abandoning it at the later point 
t = tl;, where rents equal taxes. If abandonment occurs at t(4/, then the 
owner earns profits equal to the areas jke + ej7ri. But if abandonment 
occurs earlier at t$ then the owner receives the shaded areas jalk + abed. 
Since the value of taxes not paid is the same in both cases (Imcd = enhi), it 
is therefore more profitable to abandon earlier at t; since the triangle enf is 
larger than the triangle bem. 
‘Although owners are not actually paying property taxes at the time the city forecloses on 
their buildings, property taxes are nonetheless an important determinant of the abandonment 
decision. 
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A further point is that according to Fig. 1, it is actually optimal to set the 
date of abandonment g periods before the intersection of the tax and rent 
curves, so that the grace period ends exactly at the intersection. This is 
because in the diagram the interest rate, r, is assumed to be zero. With a 
positive interest rate, the optimal abandonment date is earlier, as at t;. 
Solving (5) for t,, we get 
1 
t,= -1 In PQD 
[i 1 
-El- +g(r+d). 1 
From (7), for the owner to hold the building at all; i.e., for t, > 0, initial 
taxes must be less than initial rents (or TD/PQD < 1). 
How does varying the length of the grace period affect the timing of 
abandonment? Differentiating (7), we find that atA/ag < 0; i.e., the shorter 
the grace period, the later is the optimal date of abandonment. Landlords 
profit from the grace period, because while it is running they collect rents 
but pay no taxes. Since rent receipts fall over time, the grace period is more 
profitable the earlier it starts. But the longer the grace period, the larger the 
landlords’ incentive to start it early while rents are relatively high. Con- 
versely, a shorter grace period makes it worthwhile for landlords to con- 
tinue ownership longer, since the profitable period when no taxes are paid is 
shorter and foreclosure comes sooner. At the limit if the grace period is 
zero, then landlords continue ownership until profits equal zero. 
The length of the grace period is determined by each city. In Chicago it is 
2 years. In New York, it was recently reduced from a minimum of 3 years 
to 1 year for large buildings. The apparent motivation for reducing the 
period in New York was that with faster foreclosure, abandoned buildings 
would be in better condition at the time of takeover and would therefore be 
less expensive for the city to repair and operate and be easier to sell. 
However, the analysis above suggests that a shorter grace period should 
also reduce the number of abandonments. From the viewpoint of cities, the 
optimal grace period clearly is zero, i.e., immediate initiation of foreclosure 
proceedings as soon as property taxes go into arrears.‘o 
We can also examine the effect on abandonment incentives of a policy of 
reducing assessment levels of blighted buildings by some arbitrary amount. 
Since at,/aTD < 0, the optimal abandonment date is later if a building’s 
assessment (and therefore its tax liability) is lower. We investigate this effect 
empirically below. 
“A grace period of zero might be administratively infeasible, since cities often make 
mistakes in sending out property tax bills and recording receipt of payment. Also any 
shortening of the grace period involves transition problems not considered here, since it makes 
eligible for immediate foreclosure many buildings whose owners may not have intended to 
abandon them. 
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FIGURE 2 
Finally, suppose that the property tax system were changed in a more 
fundamental way, so that taxes were a l&d proportion of rent minus 
maintenance costs (or a different fixed proportion of market value). Figure 
2 shows this possibility. Here there would be no incentive for an owner to 
abandon a building as long as rent minus maintenance costs is positive. 
Property taxes would not accelerate abandonment of buildings. Owners 
would hold on to their buildings as long as rent levels were positive. A 
property tax system of this sort is probably ideal, while the proposed policy 
of reducing assessments on properties in blighted neighborhoods by an 
ad hoc amount is second-best. Given the importance of the abandonment 
problem and the reluctance of cities to allow property assessments to 
change very much, however, it seems important to explore the effects of 
second-best policy options which involve less radical change.l’ 
III. DATA AND ESTIMATION 
Proceeding toward an empirical specification, we know that the condition 
for abandonment in a continuous time context is that (5) must hold at the 
time of abandonment. We also know that the market value of a building 
equals the sum of its discounted future stream of net rents minus property 
taxes. Thus, from (4), 
MV- - fib-- (r+4(t,+g) - 11 + zge-% _ 11. (8) 
The data set to be used in the estimation includes information on average 
market value and average property taxes for buildings in neighborhoods in 
“Note that lowering the assessments of properties in neighborhoods where abandonments 
are likely would not violate the legal requirement in many states that assessed value/market 
value ratios and effective property tax rates must be the same in all neighborhoods. Since the 
value of buildings in these neighborhoods has probably been falling, a lower assessment is 
necessary to keep the effective property tax rate from rising. 
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New York City, but no information on average rent levels. However, (7) 
and (8) form a set of simultaneous equations involving the known variables 
TD, and My (where i denotes an individual neighborhood), the parame- 
ters g, d, and r, and the unknown variables t,, and PQD,. Substituting 
values for the parameters, we can use numerical techniques to solve for the 
average values of t,, and of PQDi for each neighborhood. The solution for 
PQDi in general form is 
PQDi =f(M&, TD,, r, g, d). (9) 
If the true average value of rent in neighborhood i is PQDi, then we assume 
that the calculated value mi is related to the true average value by the 
following: 
PQDi = PQD, + qip 00) 
where&s a random error term having mean zero which is uncorrelated 
withPQDi. 
For an individual building j in neighborhood i, abandonment occurs or 
has already occurred if (5) is zero or negative at t = t, = 0 or 
e-(‘+d)gPQDij - TD, I 0. 01) 
Suppose that an estimate of (11) for building j in neighborhood i is 
provided by evaluating (5) using the average level of property taxes for 
neighborhood i, TD,, and the true average value of rents for neighborhood 
i, PQDi. Then we have 
e-(*+d)gpQDij - TDij = e-(‘+d)gmi - TDi - eij, 
where &ij is a random error term having mean zero. For abandonment to be 
worthwhile, it must be the case that 
e -c’+d)gPQDi - TDi I qj. 02) 
Suppose that the eij terms are distributed according to the Weibull 
distribution. Then the probability of an individual building being aban- 
doned could be expressed as 
Prob[(e- (r+d)gmi - TDi) I cij] 
exp[ b( e-(r+d)gFQDi - TDi)] 
= 1 + exp[b(e- (‘+d)@Di + TDi)] . (13) 
This expression can be estimated using the logit technique. 
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However, the available data do not pertain to individual buildings, but to 
the average characteristics of buildings and the aggregate rate of abandon- 
ment in different neighborhoods. An aggregation or grouping procedure is 
therefore necessary. Since (13) describes the probability that an individual 
building will be abandoned conditional solely on neighborhood characteris- 
tics, it also describes the forecast for the percentage of buildings in 
neighborhood i that will be abandoned. Given the model, the percentage 
abandoned will have a muhinomial distribution around this mean with an 
extremely tight distribution, since the number of buildings in each neigh- 
borhood is large. Given the large number of buildings, the variance of the 
error of our forecast for the percentage abandoned should be trivial. 
However, we observe not PQDi, but mi. Conditional on what we 
observe, the actual percentage of buildings abandoned in neighborhood i 
can be expressed as 
exp[ b( ep(‘+d)g(mi + qi) - TD,)] 
pi = 1 + exp[ j?( e- fr+d)gmi + vi) - TD,)] 
Collecting terms in (14), we get the equation to be estimated: 
04 
log& = b(e- (r+4gj@ji - TD,) - be-('+d)gqi. 05) 
Note that unlike most logit equations, (15) contains no constant term. 
One problem with the above derivation, ignored previously for simplicity, 
is that larger buildings having more apartments will have higher values of 
mi, PQDi, and TDi, and presumably will have higher variances of eij 
and of vi. Yet a critical assumption of (13) is that &ij is homoscedastic. In 
deriving our final specification, we assume that the standard deviations of 
both eij and vi are proportional to TDi and then correct for heteroscedas- 
ticity by dividing the rent and tax terms in (14) by TDi. Given this 
specification, (14) becomes 
exp[ /3( e-(r+d)g( (@Ei + Bi)/TDi) - I)] 
pi = 1 + exp p( e- (r+d’g((~i + lli)/TDi) - l)] 
(14’) 
where the error term is now be -(“d)g(q./TDi), which we have assumed to 




‘*See Pindyck and Rubinfeld [S]. 
322 MICHELLE J. WHITE 
Finally, an additional heteroscedasticity problem is that the variance of 
the error term is likely to be related to characteristics of each neighborhood’s 
resident population and to characteristics other than size of its buildings. 
For example, a neighborhood having large numbers of families receiving 
public assistance is likely to have more low-value buildings and therefore a 
larger proportion of negative error terms. The same may be the case for 
neighborhoods with more undesireable building types, such as “old law 
tenements” and other old or walkup apartment buildings.13 
Suppose therefore that Gi is a vector of neighborhood variables related to 
the error variance in (15’). Specifically, assume that the standard deviation 
of the error term in (15’) varies directly with l/b”Gi, where b” is a new 
vector of parameter values including a constant term b[. The equation to 
be estimated then becomes - 
Pi 
log1 - pi 





+ * * * +yilj, (15”) 
where yij is the new homoscedastic error term. We present results below for 
both (15’) and (15r’).14 
The dependent variable used in the regressions is the probability of a 
building in neighborhood i being abandoned by its owner, as measured by 
its being in arrears on property taxes but not yet taken over by the city. At 
the time period to which the data refers, New York could not foreclose on 
buildings until they were at least 3 years in tax arrears. Also, because 
foreclosures in each borough occurred only at discrete intervals of about 2 
13“Old law tenements” are apartment buildings built before 1901. They were not required to 
have separate kitchen or bathroom facilities in each apartment, were walkups, and had 
virtually complete coverage of the lot by the building. 
“It should be noted that if payment of property taxes and of a mortgage are dropped 
simultaneously (rather than the mortgage payment being dropped sooner as assumed here), 
then the estimated effect of a property tax reduction on the probability of abandonment may 
be biased. From the theoretical development above, if both payments are dropped simulta- 
neously but the date of foreclosure remains unchanged, then owners have an incentive to 
abandon their buildings (i.e., to set rA) at an earlier date. But the effect of lowering property 
tax liability on the date and probability of abandonment would depend on whether the private 
lender then changed its behavior and foreclosed first. 
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years, the average grace period could be expected to stretch for about 4 
years. 
An important issue here is the definition of when buildings are aban- 
doned. In the model, profits accruing during the grace period (when rents 
are received but no taxes are paid) are an important factor in the decision 
to abandon. This suggests that the abandonment decision is made at the 
time a building first goes into tax arrears. However, until the city actually 
forecloses on the building, the decision to abandon is reversible, since 
ownership can be retained by paying off the tax arrears. The model suggests 
that once it is worthwhile to start the abandonment process by ceasing to 
pay taxes, it is not generally worthwhile to reverse the decision, especially if 
cities charge penalties as well as interest for late payment of taxes. How- 
ever, owners having cash flow problems may defer paying taxes because 
even a high-interest loan from the city is valuable. These owners may have 
no intention of abandoning their buildings. In addition, if neighborhood 
conditions (G;) improve, then it could be worthwhile to reverse an earlier 
decision to abandon. 
The units of observation used in the regressions are neighborhoods in 
New York City, of which there are about 260.15 For each neighborhood, the 
following data were obtained concerning buildings in tax arrears: the 
percentage of buildings which were between 9 and 17 months in tax arrears, 
the percentage of buildings between 18 months and 3 years in tax arrears, 
and the percentage of buildings more than 3 years in tax arrears. The 
percentage of buildings between 18 months and 3 years in arrears was 
chosen as the group of abandonments to be explained. This was done 
because the data concerning more recent abandonments are most likely. to 
be contaminated with owners temporarily in arrears who do not intend to 
abandon their buildings, while the data concerning buiklings more that 3 
years in arrears are affected by the fact that varying numbers of buildings in 
different regions of the city will have already been foreclosed and therefore 
out of the sample. 
We present results explaining abandonment rates for both 1976 and 
1978. For 1976, the mean probability of a building being between 18 
%everal neighborhoods containing no population (e.g., parks and cemeteries) and neigh- 
borhoods for which data were missing were dropped from the sample. All of the data come 
from special reports on neighborhoods put together by the New York City Department of City 
Planning from data in the MISLAND (Standardized Computer Report Package for Land Use, 
Housing and Demographic Information) system. The special studies are entitled “Neighbor- 
hood Statistical Profiles,” prepared by Cooperative Community Planning, NYC Department of 
City Planning (197Q and “Trends in Tax Arrears,” NYC Department of City Planning. The 
data were assembled for a 1980 study of property taxes by the New York University Graduate 
School of Public Administration (Dick Netzer, Project Director, entitled “Real Property Tax 
Policy for New York City”). 
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TABLE 1 
Data Means and Standard Deviations 
Date Means Standard deviations 



























months and 3 years in arrears was 0.062. For 1978, the figure is 0.055. (See 
Table 1 for data means and standard deviations.) In comparison, the mean 
probability of a building being in tax arrears from 9 months until fore- 
closure (i.e., being in any of the three groups of buildings in arrears) was 
0.145 in 1976 and 0.143 in 1978. Henceforth, references to the probability 
of abandonment will refer to the probability of a building being between 18 
months and 3 years in tax arrears.16 
There are three groups of explanatory variables. The first includes the 
property tax and average rent variables whose theoretical derivation is 
described above. For each neighborhood in the sample, the number of 
buildings sold in arm’s-length transactions between July 1974 and July 1976 
was available, as well as the average assessed value and average market 
value (sales price) for all buildings that were sold. (The average number of 
sales in a neighborhood was 780.) To measure average property tax liability 
for buildings in neighborhood i, we multiplied the average assessed value of 
buildings sold in the neighborhood times the citywide statutory property 
tax rate of 8.75%. The resulting average property tax liability per building 
in neighborhood i is denoted TD,. The assessed value of buihlings sold is 
likely to differ from that of buildings abandoned, since the sample of 
buildings sold is drawn from a population which excludes abandoned 
buildings. However, I assume here that the resulting bias is low since the 
probability of abandonment is itself fairly low. 
The average rent variable, mi, is derived as explained above from 
neighborhood data concerning average property tax liability and average 
16The results of explaining abandonment rates in the other categories or of explaining 
overall abandonment rates were very similar to the results given below. 
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market value of buildings sold during 1974-1976. The parameter values 
used to solve for si from (9) are d = 0.05, r = 0.04, and g = 4. 
The second group of variables measures characteristics of the buildings in 
each neighborhood. Together they constitute the vector of neighborhood 
characteristics, G,. The physical variables are OLD, the percentage of 
buildings in the neighborhood built before 1939; OLTN, the percentage of 
buildings in the neighborhood that are old law tenements; and SFHU, the 
percentage of housing units in the neighborhood that are in one- or 
two-family houses. The variables OLD and SFHU are for 1970, while 
OLTN is for 1978. Since these variables change extremely slowly over time, 
the wide range of dates was not considered to be a problem. Also since each 
variable is available for only a single year, the same data are used to explain 
both abandonment rates in 1976 and lagged abandonment rates in 1978. 
Finally, the third group of variables measures the characteristics of 
people in the neighborhood. These are WLFR, the percentage of population 
in the neighborhood receiving public assistance, and INCOME, a measure 
of mean income of households in the neighborhood. Both variables are for 
1974. 
The welfare variable is of particular interest because it has been sug- 
gested by Salins [6] that the presence of families on welfare is an important 
determinant of housing abandonment in New York. Salins argues that the 
New York system of providing a separate and relatively generous welfare 
grant for housing alone (the “shelter allowance”) means that welfare 
families have an incentive to move frequently, since a change in family 
status may increase the allowable housing grant, although the household 
can take advantage of the change only by moving. (Moving costs also are 
covered.) Further, because rent control holds down rent levels, welfare 
families have access to middle-class neighborhoods. But wel’fare families are 
destructive of housing because they often cash their shelter allowance 
checks rather than giving them to landlords. Finally, landlords are often 
unable to evict tenants who do not pay rent, both because the courts are 
slow and because the courts often do not allow evictions if buildings have 
code violations, even if the latter are tenant-created. When welfare families 
are finally evicted, their moving costs are paid by the welfare system, no 
attempt is made to penalize them for their nonpayment of rent, and a new 
cycle starts in a new apartment. Thus the argument is that welfare families 
moving into a neighborhood destabilize it by their frequent moves, damage 
the buildings, cause nonwelfare families to flee and, finally, set off a cycle of 
abandonments which then spreads to contiguous blocks. We can examine 
here the hypothesis that the presence of welfare families is an important 
determinant of the level of abandonment in the neighborhood. The sign of 
the welfare variable is expected to be positive. 
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TABLE 2 































Table 2 gives the results of estimating (15’) for 1976 and 1978.” The first 
entry of the table, labeled logit results, gives the raw logit coefficient of 
the term [(e-0.36m./TDi) - 11. (Standard errors are in parentheses.) The 
second entry of the ’ table, labeled coefficients, gives the change in the 
probability of abandonment per unit change in property tax liability, or 
api/aTDi. This figure is derived from the raw logit result via the following 
steps: (1) the raw logit result is multiplied by p(l - F), where E is the mean 
probability of abandonment; (2) the derivative of the term 
[(e-“.36mi/TD,) - l] with re= to TO, (holding m, constant) is 
evaluated at the mean values of PQD, and TDi; and (3) the results of steps 
(1) and (2) are multiplied together. Finally, the third entry of the table 
transforms the coefficient into an elasticity of changes in property tax 
liability on the probability of abandonment, evaluated at the means of TD, 
and pi. Thus the tax coefficient in 1976 indicates that a $1000 increase in 
average property tax liability causes an increase of 0.05 in the rate of 
abandonment, holding rents constant. The elasticity term indicates that a 
1% increase in property tax liability causes a 2.1% increase in the probabil- 
ity of abandonment. 
The results suggest that property taxes have a very large and significant 
effect on abandonment rates. A 1% rise in property taxes causes an increase 
of about 2.1% in the abandonment rate immediately (1976 results). The 
lagged effect of the rise in property taxes is somewhat smaller but equally 
significant- the elasticity of ,the abandonment rate with respect to property 
taxes for 1978 is 1.65. To illustrate this effect, suppose that the average 
building in the sample had its assessed value reduced by $1000, from 
$30,300 to $29,300. This change would reduce average property tax liability 
“R2 values are not given in the tables, since the equations estimated do not have constant 
terms. 
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TABLE 3 
Logit Regression Results Explaining Probability of Abandomnent 








































































by 3.3% and would thus cause the probability of abandonment to fall by 
about 7% in 1976, or from a rate of 6.2% to a rate of 5.8%. 
The error terms of the regressions reported in Table 2 were tested for 
heteroscedasticity by regressing the residuals squared against the vector of 
neighborhood effects, with all variables in log form. Since the results 
indicated significant heteroscedasticity (using an F test) in both the 1976 
and 1978 regressions, the equations were reestimated according to the 
specification in (15”). The results are reported in Table 3. 
The first row of Table 3, labeled TD, has the same interpretation as in 
Table 2. Note that the tax effects on abandonment are similar to those in 
Table 2 and are highly significant. The elasticity of the abandonment rate 
with respect to property tax liability is slightly larger than in Table 2; it is 
2.5 for 1976 and 2.9 for 1978. 
Results given for the other variables are interpreted as follows. Taking 
the old law tenement variable as an example, the fhst entry is the raw logit 
coefficient of the term OLTN[(e-".36mi/TDl) - l] and the second and 
third entries are the coefficient api/aOLTNi and the elasticity of changes in 
OLTN on the probability of abandonment. The coefficient api/aOLTNi is 
derived from the raw logit result by multiplying the raw logit result by 
p(1 - p) and by [(cz-'-~$@/TD,) - 11, evaluated at the means of PQDi 
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and TDi. The elasticity is evaluated at the mean values of pi and OLTNi. 
Thus the effect in 1976 of a one percentage point increase in the proportion 
of housing that is old law tenements on the abandonment rate is 0.037 and 
the effect of a 1% increase in the proportion of housing that is old law 
tenements is a 0.03% increase in the abandonment rate. 
Examining the effects of the nontax variables, it is interesting that none 
of the physical variables pertaining to the housing stock appears to be 
strongly related to abandonment. In both regressions, none of these vari- 
ables is significantly related to the abandonment rate and SFHU has the 
wrong sign. Thus the results do not support the hypothesis that the types of 
buildings present in particular neighborhoods are a significant determinant 
of the abandonment rate, i.e., structures do not appear to be abandoned by 
their owners merely because they are outdated building types or retained 
because they are popular building types. 
In contrast, the welfare effects are consistently significant but small. A 1% 
increase in the proportion of the population receiving welfare causes a 
0.092% increase in the abandonment rate in the 1976 equation and a 0.098% 
increase in the 1978 equation. Finally, the income variable has the correct 
sign but is insignificant in both equations. 
Comparing the importance of the welfare variable with that of the 
property tax variable, in both equations the elasticity of the abandonment 
rate with respect to property taxes is more than 20 times as large as the 
elasticity of abandonment with respect to the welfare population. In ad- 
dition, property tax liabilities are a variable which is directly under the 
control of the city government, unlike that of the welfare population. We 
now turn to the issue of using property tax assessments as a policy variable 
to reduce abandonment rates. 
IV. PROPERTY TAX POLICY ISSUES 
The regression results are quite striking in that they suggest that property 
tax and assessment levels are important determinants of abandonment 
rates. In addition to taxes being the largest factor, taxes also differ from 
other variables in that they are policy instruments controlled by cities. The 
results suggest that cities can have an important impact on abandonment 
rates by introducing a policy of systematic downward assessment of build- 
ings in blighted neighborhoods-and by following up abandonments with a 
policy of immediate foreclosure once property taxes go into arrears. Such 
an approach appears to be much more direct and feasible than attempting 
to reduce abandonment indirectly by replacing old buildings with new or 
by raising public assistance payments to poor families. 
To illustrate, examine one blighted neighborhood in the sample- 
Brownsville in Brooklyn-which was among the several worst neighbor- 
hoods in the sample. Its probability of abandonment as of 1978 was 17%. A 
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total of 55% of its buildings were in tax arrears by 9 months or more in 
1978. The average market value of buildings sold there in 1976-1978 was 
$24,000 and the average assessed value of buildings sold was $17,000. 
Suppose that a policy were introduced of systematically reducing assess- 
ments on all buildings in areas such as Brownsville. (The policy could be 
applied generally to large areas such as neighborhoods or could be applied 
to smaller areas such as census tracts or blocks.) If all assessments in the 
neighborhood were reduced by $1000 per building, the average property tax 
liability in Brownsville would fall by one-seventeenth, or 6%. Using the 
results in Table 2 for 1976, the model predicts that this change would cause 
the abandonment rate in Brownsville to fall by 13% or from a rate of 17% 
to a rate of 14.8%. 
What are the costs and benefits of such a policy? The cost to the city 
would be about $90 per year in foregone taxes per building actually paying 
property taxes. There are 2700 residential properties in Brownsville, of 
which about 1200 were paying property taxes as they came due in 1978. 
Thus the policy would cost the city about $109,000 per year in foregone 
taxes for the entire neighborhood. 
The total benefit of the policy is more difficult to calculate, since it 
includes both increased tax revenues on buildings not abandoned and 
reduced costs to the city of operating buildings that are in rem and/or 
relocating welfare families that are forced to move. Examining the first, the 
regression results imply that the policy will cause 60 fewer buildings in 
Brownsville to be abandoned in 1978. Suppose that these buildings have 
assessments equal to the average for Brownsville. Tax revenues on these 
buildings at the reduced assessment level amount to $86,000 per year. 
Second, if the 60 buildings were abandoned, some of them would be 
operated by the city under the in rem program. In 1982, New York City 
spent $147 million (net of rents collected) operating 3800 abandoned 
buildings, or a cost of $37,800 per building per year.18 Suppose that only 
one-quarter of the newly abandoned buildings would be operated by the 
city” and that the equivalent cost in 1978 would have been only half as 
great due to inflation in the intervening period. In that case, not operating 
15 in rem buildings would save the city $13,900 per building, for a total 
savings of $208,000 in 1978. 
Thus in our example, reducing all assessments in Brownsville by $1000 
would cost the city $109,000 per year in reduced property tax receipts, but 
“See “Rundown Buildings Called Housing Resource,” New York Times, May 2 (1983). The 
cost per person living in abandoned buildings is $1470 per year. 
“Schur [7] indicates that as of 1980, New York City had taken over 13,000 buildings under 
the in rem program, of which 4000 were occupied. This implies an occupancy rate of 31%. A 
slightly lower rate of 25% is used in the calculation, since the city sometimes consolidates 
tenants of partially occupied in rem buildings. 
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would save it $86,000 per year in property taxes paid by owners of 
buildings that would otherwise be abandoned, plus $108,000 per year in 
foregone operating costs of in rem buildings. The benefit/cost ratio is 2.7 
for such a policy. Further, benefits could be expected to rise over several 
years as the number of buildings not abandoned due to the policy rises. 
Obviously these calculations are crude. 2o They would also be different for 
other cities having different policies toward abandoned housing and dis- 
placed families. But the results suggest that property taxes are an important 
factor in causing ownership abandonment of housing in blighted neighbor- 
hoods. Cities have considerable control over property taxes-they set both 
assessment levels and the grace period until foreclosure. This study suggests 
that a systematic policy of cutting property tax assessments in blighted 
neighborhoods but taking over properties as soon as tax payments start to 
go into arrears could have significant downward effects on rates of owner- 
ship abandonment. 
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